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CONFLICT OF LAWS TREATMENT OF WARRANTIES
AND REPRESENTATIONS IN LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES-PART TWO*
WENDELL CARNAHANt
III. APPLICATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS RuLEs -
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS
1. Requirement that application be attached to policy.
It was pointed out in the earlier part of this article that a
number of states have enacted statutes constituting the policy
the entire contract or providing that, unless a copy of the appli-
cation is attached to the policy, the facts regarding misrepre-
sentations inducing the contract shall not be admitted into evi-
dence. Cases involving statutes of this type have presented the
question whether those provisions are substantive or remedial;
the diversity of approach is indicated in a subsequent subdivi-
sion dealing with procedural and substantive aspects of war-
ranty statutes.
At this point it may be noted that these statutes have been
regarded as strong evidence of local policy. In cases where the
forum was the place of making of the contract, its courts or
federal courts sitting in that state have invariably applied the
local statute which was favorable to the claimantYD So, also,
* This paper forms the basis of a chapter in a forthcoming book on
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN LiFE INsuRANcE CONTRACTS. All rights are reserved.
Part one of this article appears at 27 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 30.
t Professor of Law, Washington University.
69. Stipcich v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1928) 277 U. S. 311, reversing
(D. C. D. Ore. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 285 (held that, on construction, "entire
contract" statute of place of making did not exclude duty of applicant to
disclose interim health change but, on facts, notice to agent was imputed
to insurer; note that place of making rule is approved); Provident Say. L.
Assur. Soc. of N. Y. v. Hadley (C. C. A. 1, 1900) 102 Fed. 856; Great
Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Burwell (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 12 F. (2d) 244, cert.
den. (1926) 271 U. S. 683; Bukowski v. Security Ben. Assoc. of Topeka,
Kan. (1935) 221 Iowa 416, 261 N. W. 783 (note that carrier was a fra-
ternal); Schuler v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1915) 191 Mo. App. 52, 176
S. W. 274 (policy provided that New York law was to govern but its
statute was similar to that of Missouri); Mees v. Pittsburgh L. & T. Co.
(1915) 169 App. Div. 86, 154 N. Y. S. 660 (rule clearly indicated but
inconclusive since on demurrer).
But cf. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Lodzinski (1937) 122 N. J. Eq. 404,
194 Atl. 79.
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when the forum was not the place where the policy was received
by the applicant, that state has looked to and applied a statute
of this type obtaining in the state which was the place of making
of the insurance contract.70 In several instances where the law
of the place where the contract was physically received was not
favorable to the claimant, a court of that state has effectuated
an express provision in the contract that the law of the state
of the insurer's home-office shall govern the contract and, in so
doing, has applied a statute of the sister-state requiring the
application to be attached to the policy and prescribing conse-
quences for the violation of that provision.7 1
2. Waiver and estoppel regarding health statements.
Some of the most difficult problems in the general law of
insurance involve the scope of waiver. As will be noted, courts
have used the term "estoppel" in insurance law to express one
form of waiver; but for the purposes of this subdivision the
problems will be treated separately. The doctrine of waiver in
insurance largely owes its development, in the period before
statutes were generally enacted, to the practice by insurance
companies of multiplying warranties and providing that the
policy would be forfeited for breach of condition. Warranties
in insurance are essentially conditions in a specialized type of
contract. In other branches of contracts law the rule is clear
that breach of a material condition does not forfeit or make void
a contract; the failure to perform a condition gives to the non-
breaching party an election either to refuse further perform-
ance under the contract or to insist upon that performance which
remains possible to the breaching party.7 2 In early insurance
cases the courts treated all express warranties as material condi-
tions, instead of noticing that many warranties actually related
to immaterial points. That is, many statements in the policy
which were there declared to be warranties did not induce the
insurer to enter into the contract and did not relate, actually or
70. Rauen v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1906) 129 Iowa '725, 106 N. W. 198.
Cf. Des Moines L. Assoc. v. Owen (1897) 10 Colo. App. 131, 50 Pac. 210,
in which forum looked to sister-state statute but treated part of its provi-
sions as procedural, as to which local law applied.
71. Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v. Lovelace (1907) 1 Ga. App. 446, 58
S. E. 93; Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Pollard (1896) 94 Va. 146, 26 S. E.
421, 36 L. R. A. 271, 64 Am. St. Rep. 715.
72. See 3 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) §§683, 688, 746, 1956.
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potentially, to the event which would constitute the casualty for
which insurance was sought.73
In explaining their decisions in insurance cases courts spoke
of automatic forfeiture (voidness) for breaches of warranty
(condition). Opinions would have been more understandable in
the light of the rule in other contracts cases, and many hard-
ships would have been avoided if the courts had held that breach
of warranties upon material points merely gave an option or
election to the insurer to avoid the contract upon notice of the
breach, and that statements upon immaterial points did not come
within the classification of warranties. In time evils flowing
from the initial error became apparent. One of the devices by
which the judiciary then attempted to cope with the problem
was by formulation of the rule that these conditions, inserted by
and on behalf of the carrier, might be waived by it. As the in-
surers revised their forms and inserted a clause to the effect
that no agent had the power to waive either performance of con-
ditions or forfeitures occasioned by their non-performance, the
courts rejoined with the rule that the insurer may waive its
non-waiver clause in the contract.
Many cases have dealt with the determination of what factors
constituted waiver and have distinguished acts of waiver com-
ing after maturity of the claim and waivers contemporaneous
with or antecedent to issuance of the contract. These problems
of the general law of insurance are beyond the scope of the pres-
ent study although the ways in which courts have applied prin-
ciples of waiver in conflict of laws cases have arisen in connec-
tion with a number of different policy provisions in addition to
those relating to warranties and representations. It may be
pointed out, however, that this portion of the law has been
marked by a general failure to recognize that the term "waiver"
is one of multiple meanings. Williston, 74 for example, assigns
73. An example is the statement by an applicant that he had three living
sisters, whose ages were 52, 47, and 36 years, whereas their actual ages
were 49, 44, and 33 years. Insurance is not based upon recital of ages of
one's living sisters and hence the statements did not induce the contract
by misleading the insurer upon a material point; the ages of applicant's
sisters will not cause his death or bear upon the time of its occurrence.
Yet in a case on similar facts it has been held that the breach of warranty
constituted a defense to the insurer. See Kansas Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Pinson
(1901) 94 Tex. 553, 63'S. W. 531 (not conflicts case).
74. 3 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) §679.
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to it nine distinct denotations. Lack of careful exposition of the
sense in which the term is employed has been the general rule.
An outstanding exception is the treatment by Ewarts who con-
tends that in insurance law the term "waiver" may be confined
to three meanings: a new contract, supported by consideration,
modifying an old one; an election by the insurer between incon-
sistent courses of conduct; and estoppel. Some problems in con-
flict of laws cases relating to waiver will be considered before
examining the concept of estoppel and the cases bearing upon
it.
A few states have statutes to the effect that when an applica-
tion is made within the state, any resulting policy of insurance
shall be taken as a contract made within the state and governed
by its laws. These statutes have been used in conflict of laws
cases as a means for localizing the contract with the end in view
of then applying internal common law rules of waiver so desig-
nated.76 This rule was also recognized in a federal court case77
which, however, declined to apply the state law under the doc-
trine of Swift v. Tyson,78 now overruled by the decision in Erie
R. R. Co. v. Tompkins. 9
A substantial number of states have also enacted statutes pro-
viding, in substance, that the solicitor shall be considered and
taken to be the agent of the insurance company. It is believed
obvious that the descriptive phrases "agent" or "agency" are
meaningless, unless the particular powers of the agent or the
purpose with reference to which they are used is made clear.
For example, in problems of delivery in the internal law of in-
surance, the transmission of a policy to the insurance solicitor
may constitute him an agent of the insured for the purpose of
determining the time at which the contract had its inception. In
contrast, courts in conflict of laws cases have generally not
75. Ewart, Waiver Distributed (1917) passim.
76. State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis v. Westcott (1910) 166 Ala. 192,
52 So. 344-statute used to bring contract within general misrepresentation
rule which was then held to supersede policy clause calling for construction
by law of insurer's home-state; Fidelity Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Miazza (1908)
98 Miss. 18, 46 So. 817, 136 Am. St. Rep. 534-death within two months,
insured suffering from deranged mind; judgment for plaintiff reversed and
case remanded.
77. Fountain & Herrington v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. (C. C. A.
4, 1932) 55 F. (2d) 120.
78. (U. S. 1842) 16 Pet. 1.
79. (1988) 804 U. S. 64.
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treated the solicitor to whom the policy was mailed an agent of
the applicant for purposes of determining that the insurance had
its inception at the place where the policy was deposited with
postal authorities. In these cases a declaration that the solicitor
is the agent of the applicant would be beneficial to the insured
in the first situation, but would be inimical to the purpose of
protecting the applicant in the latter instance. In waiver cases,
on the other hand, consideration of the solicitor as agent of the
company best achieves the same protective function. Opinions
by courts in states having agency statutes of the type referred
to do not notice the shift in function of the terms, or consider
application of the statutes to problems of delivery. In relation
to health conditions, utilization of the statute for the purpose of
designating the solicitor as agent of the carrier, followed by
employment of the fiction that disclosure to an agent within the
scope of his employment is notice to the principal, operates (ac-
cording, to the terminology of various courts) as either waiver
by, estoppel against, or election on the part of the principal not
to "forfeit" the policy because of breach of condition. Judicial
employment of terminology more accurately expressing the legal
relations would go far to clarify internal law problems and con-
flict of laws cases arising under statutes of this type.
There have been relatively few cases arising under the agency
statutes in which notice was taken of the conflict of laws prob-
lem. With one exception, those cases have all been decided in
federal courts and in them the statute of the place of making of
the contract has been applied. In these instances the state in
which the district court was sitting was the place where the
policy was received by the applicant,80 but a statute of the place
of making preventing a waiver has also been applied by a court
sitting in another state.8
The importance in these cases of properly pleading and prov-
80. Continental L. Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Chamberlain (1889)
132 U. S. 304-solicitor said that certificates in cooperative societies did
not constitute "other insurance"; Stipcich v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1928)
277 U. S. 311-interim disclosure of discovery of duodenal ulcer; New Yorr
L. Ins. Co. v. Russell (C. C. A. 8, 1896) 77 Fed. 94-removal case; appli-
cant said he had been treated for diabetes; examiner said he did not have
it and wrote "No"; Bank Say. L. Ins. Co. v. Butler (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 38
F. (2d) 972-application for reinstatement and answers correctly given
but not transcribed by the agent who believed that reinstatement was based
upon health conditions at the time the policy lapsed.
81. New York L. Ins. Co. v. Rigas (1933) 117 Conn. 437, 168 Atl. 22.
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ing foreign law, when the forum is not the place of making of
the contract, is indicated by Moak v. Continental Casualty Com-
pany82 which involved a disability contract. The policy had been
issued in New York and the disability arose there; the agent had
incorrectly written answers in respect to the age of the appli-
cant. By the local rule of Tennessee, the forum, the facts would
establish a waiver and, although New York law was not proved,
the court stated that it found the New York rule to be of the
same effect. Apparently the forum applied local rules as such.
The case would be more extreme if it had been shown that New
York law had established, as was very clearly expressed, for
example, in Minsker v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company,8 a duty upon the applicant to read over the completed
application. It will be recalled that it was a failure to apply the
New York rule, when correctly pleaded, which constituted the
basis of reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States in
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Yates.8 4
There have been several other cases raising questions of waiver
as a matter of common law. In them the issue has generally
been resolved by determination of the place of making of the
contract and application of its rule; in most instances it was
found that the state of the forum was the place of making of
the agreement.8 5
The term "estoppel," like that of "waiver," has several pos-
sible meanings. The common law estoppel by representation-
called also equitable estoppel, and estoppel in pais8q-required a
misrepresentation of a past or present material fact, followed
by reliance on the part of the one to whom the representation
was made, by which he suffered detriment 7 But this rule did
82. (1927) 4 Tenn. App. 287.
83. (1930) 254 N. Y. 833, 173 N. E. 4, 81 A. L. R. 829.
84. (1986) 299 U. S. 178.
85. Fletcher v. New York L. Ins. Co. (C. C. Mo. 1882) 13 Fed. 526-
it was claimed that correct answers were given but fraudulently transcribed
differently and were not read by the applicant; Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum
(1901) 198 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915--whether there was power in the subordi-
nate lodge to waive a by-law of the association forbidding admission to
membership of one dealing in liquor is to be determined by the law of the
forum as place of making; Schuler v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1915) 191
Mo. App. 52, 176 S. W. 274-instruction that if the jury found that the
applicant or anyone for her made known her condition to the agent or
examining physician, or he knew the condition, his knowledge would be
considered that of the company and constitute a waiver, was not erroneous.
86. See 8 Williston, Cont'acts (Rev. ed. 1936) §692.
87. See Ewart, Estoppel (1900) 10, 222 et seq. At page 10, Ewart lists
eleven requisites for estoppel by misrepresentations.
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not meet the thought necessity of precluding recovery by one
who had made misleading statements based upon expectation or
promises concerning conditions to arise in the future. Estoppel
was extended to include these circumstances and the distinction
was then indicated by use of the term "promissory estoppel." ' ,8
It will be noted that in each of these instances an estoppel does
not exist unless there is a misrepresentation of a fact, or non-
performance of a promise, coupled with prejudicial reliance
thereon. Coupled with the confusion inherent in use of the broad
term "waiver," use of the terminology of "estoppel" has resulted
in a great amount of flexibility in favor of claimants against
insurance companies.
A few states have undertaken to deal partially with the prob-
lems of warranties and representations by statutes89 providing
in effect that where a medical examiner for an insurance com-
pany declares an applicant a fit subject for insurance, except in
case of fraud or deceit on the part of the insured, the company
shall be estopped from alleging as a defense, in an action on the
policy, that the applicant was not in the required state of health
when the policy was issued. Under a statute of this type a jury
is not likely, except in unusually flagrant cases, to deny recov-
ery to a beneficiary because of fraud or deceit on the part of the
deceased insured.90
One of the earliest decisions applying an estoppel statute of
the latter type was by the Iowa court in Nelson v. Nederland
Life Insurance Company.9' A policy had been issued by a Dutch
corporation maintaining an office in New York City; the con-
tract was issued on January 18th and death occurred the fol-
lowing April 27th. There had been concealment of nephritis.
While it did not expressly appear, the insured was probably a
resident of Iowa; whether the place of making of the contract
was in Iowa or whether the company was engaged in business
there at that time is likewise problematical.92 The court not only
88. See 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) §139.
89. For statutes see note 19, Part One, supra.
90. It should be noted that these statutes may be in addition to others
in the same state dealing with incontestability generally.
91. (1900) 110 Iowa 600, 81 N. W. 807, relying upon Weimer v. Eco-
nomic L. Assoc. (1899) 108 Iowa 451, 79 N. W. 123, and Stewart v. Equi-
table Mut. L. Assoc. (1900) 110 Iowa 528, 81 N. W. 782.
92. The court did, however, use the following language: "Whether the
policy is a New York contract or not, the laws of this state relating to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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held that its estoppel statute was applicable to the facts but, on
a question of fraud, also held that another Iowa statute prevented
admission of evidence by insured's physician, disclosing a con-
fidential communication. Recovery by the beneficiary followed,
of course. If it were made to appear that Iowa was the place
of making of the contract of insurance, it is believed that the
Nelson case would represent a typical method by which states
handle cases of this type.93
8. The "delivery-in-good-health" clause.
In earlier days and in the absence of statutes, insurance com-
panies formerly had the benefit of warranties in the application
and also of the common law rule imposing a duty upon an appli-
cant to disclose changes in health occurring in the interim be-
tween application and "delivery" of the policy by the carrier.
In passing upon various problems of representations and con-
cealment the courts showed a marked tendency in internal law
cases to deal with the policy in such way that the contract had
its inception at the earliest possible time.94 In order to give pro-
tection to the applicant, courts frequently looked to some signifi-
cant act, such as approval of the application or mailing of the
policy, occurring at the insurer's home-office, as being the domi-
nant factor in establishment of the insurance relationship; this
may be termed "constructive delivery." Because of the judicial
tendency to apply a connotation of delivery other than that of
manual receipt of the document and because of the general adop-
tion of statutes converting most statements of health from war-
ranties into representations, the insurers sought to regain a
measure of protection by insertion into the contracts of a clause
requiring delivery of the policy while the applicant was in good
health,"5 thus attempting to postpone inception of the risk to
procedure control. Foreign insurance companies are not compelled to do
business in this state. If they voluntarily choose to do so, however, they
must submit to such conditions and restrictions as the legislature may see
fit to impose." (1900) 110 Iowa 600, 604, 81 N. W. 807.
93. Similar treatment of the general problem, although not under estop-
pel statutes, is represented by Connecticut Gen. L. Ins. Co. v. Richardson
(1919) 11 Ohio App. 405, and Massachusetts Ben. L. Assoc. v. Robinson(1898) 104 Ga. 256, 80 S. E. 918, 42 L. R. A. 261.
94. See, generally, Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy
(1919) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 198; Note, The Delivery-in-Good-Health Clause in
Life Insurance Policies (1934) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1508.
95. A study by Fouse, Policy Contracts in Life Insurance, appearing in
September, 1905, 26 Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Science 209, 220, re-
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the latest possible time. This clause is usually worded as a con-
dition precedent. In internal law cases the effect of the decisions
has been to treat the clause as if it were a condition precedent-to-
performance, rather than precedent-to-formation, as was the ap-
parent intention of the insurers,98 and the burden of proof of
non-performance has been allocated to the carriers. 97 A number
of courts in internal law situations, influenced by the doctrine
of freedom of contract, have been willing to interpret clauses
relating to delivery quite strictly.98 Other courts have said that
the duty to perform may arise before manual transfer to the
applicant, and hence the cases holding that constructive delivery
is sufficient are controlling even in the face of the delivery-in-
good-health clause.91
In internal law cases involving this clause the question is as
to whether the insurance was in force at a particular time; in
conflict of laws cases, on the other hand, the question is as to the
place at which the contract had its inception in order to desig-
nate the choice-of-laws rule to govern various problems. There
are a number of conflict of laws cases, dealing with problems
other than warranties, which emphasize the presence of this
clause, interpreting it quite strictly, and which regard the policy
as requiring manual transfer of the document. But treatment of
the clause in that way does not necessarily dispose of other prob-
lems raised by use of this provision. Two of the questions relat-
ported that of fifty-one companies whose forms were examined all had a
provision in the policy that it shall not become effective and binding until
delivered during the lifetime and good health of the insured and after
the required premium is actually paid.
A later study by Coke, The Commencement of the Risk in the Case of
a Life Insurance Policy (1921) Paper 51, Assoc. of Life Ins. Counsel 2, 3,
reported that the clause appeared in one hundred twelve out of one hundred
twenty-five policies examined. See Note, The Delivery-in-Good-Health Clause
in Life Insurance Policies (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1508.
The present writer has found that in forms examined of one hundred
thirteen companies writing in 1938, ninety-one carried the delivery-in-good-
health clause; in these further provision was found that the policy must
also be delivered within a limited time or the application be considered
rejected: within sixty days (thirteen companies); within forty-five days
(one company) ; within thirty days (three companies).
96. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 198, 220.
97. Note, The Delivery-in-Good-Health Clause in Life Insurance Policies
(1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1508, 1515.
98. See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy (1919) 33
Harv. L. Rev. 198, 221.
99. Note, The Delivery-in-Good-Health Clause in Life Insurance Policies
(1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1508, 1510.
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ing to warranties and representations may be stated in this way:
First, shall this clause be given the effect of constituting a con-
dition precedent to inception of the contract? Or, second, shall
this clause be held to have the effect of an independent warranty
that the applicant shall be in good health at the time of manual
receipt of the document by him?
If the first point of view is adopted, then it is more than con-
ceivable that a court may confuse the fact that warranties in
insurance law are essentially conditions, and may overlook the
fact that in both contract and insurance law broken conditions
do not "void" the contract but only constitute the basis for an
election by the non-breaching party (here the insurer) to avoid
it. A court confusing these issues may hold that non-occurrence
of the event-continued good health down to receipt of the docu-
ment-prevented the insurance from ever coming into exis-
tence ;100 that is, that the condition is one precedent-to-formation
of the contract. In that view the misrepresentation and warranty
statutes are not likely to be applied since the clause is not being
treated as a warranty-condition.
On the other hand, if the second and correct view of warran-
ties as conditions is recognized, then the delivery-in-good-health
clause is essentially a warranty, since it is a condition regarding
the applicant's health. But there are still two other questions
which the courts need to consider regarding the scope of this
clause. A court may focus attention upon health conditions at
the time of the application and say that the health of the appli-
cant shall remain good (i. e., in the same state) from the time
of application until physical transfer of the policy; this is obvi-
ously not what the insurer intended. Then, as to adverse interim
changes in health, a court may declare that the common law
doctrine of concealment would be applicable; this rule would
give the carrier insufficient protection since, under that doctrine,
an applicant is excused if non-disclosures resulted while he was
exercising good faith. On the other hand, the clause may be
viewed as an independent warranty that the applicant shall be
in good health at the time of transfer of the document (what-
ever may have been his health at the time of the application) ;
in the latter view, the doctrine of concealment would be inap-
100. This confusion is apparent in Fondi v. Boston Mut. L. Ins. Co.
(1916) 224 Mass. 6, 112 N. E. 612.
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plicable. This appears to be the correct view. But in either view
the essential characteristic of the clause as a warranty should
bring it within the scope of the general warranty statutes. Any
other construction, it is believed, would open the door to the
possibility of insurers' avoiding the purpose of warranty legis-
lation by the very common addition of this extra clause. 1,
A few conflict of laws cases have properly applied restrictions
of warranty statutes to policies containing the good-health
clause. 10 2 But a recent federal case103 serves as a warning that
this rule is far from completely accepted. In that case an Illinois
insurer brought a bill in the district court in New York for can-
cellation of a life insurance policy. The application had been
made in Massachusetts and the policy had been mailed by the
carrier to one of its agents in Massachusetts and by him to the
insured in New York. The application contained this clause:
"The insurance hereby applied for, or any policy issued in reli-
ance upon this application, shall not take effect unless and until
the first premium or instalment thereof is paid and the policy
delivered to and accepted by me while my health, habits and oc-
cupation are the same as described in this application." Before
delivery of the policy the applicant changed his business and
shortly after delivery sustained an attack which was diagnosed
as due to coronary thrombosis existing for a period antecedent
to delivery of the policy. It was found that the insured was ig-
norant of the real condition of his health at the time the policy
was delivered. The court allowed cancellation and the decree was
affirmed. In the appellate court it was said :104
In the view we take, whether he knew or did not know of
his condition is immaterial. His application stated that he
did not have any disease of the heart or blood vessels, and
the existence of the same state of health when the policy
was delivered was expressly agreed to be a condition prece-
dent to the insurance becoming effective. This condition was
not performed.
101. See Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law (1934) 34 Colum. L.
Rev. 595, 606-608; Note, The Delivery-in-Good-Health Clause in Life Insur-
ance Policies (1934) 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1508i 1514.
102. Coscarella v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1913) 175 Mo. App. 130,
157 S. W. 873; Atlas L. Ins. Co. v. Standfier (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 86
S. W. (2d) 852.
103. Mutual Trust L. Ins. Co. v. Ossen (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d)
317, cert. den. (1935) 296 U. S. 616.
104. Mutual Trust L. Ins. Co. v. Ossen (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d)
317, 319.
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Honest belief was insufficient. Further :105
But even if the opposite conclusion were reached, it would
not aid the appellants. The stipulation also required his oc-
cupation to remain the same as described in the application.
Ossen testified definitely that he was not in any business
after March, 1930. The testimony that he was out of busi-
ness on account of his health is very weak and is contra-
dicted. But the reason for leaving the occupation described
in his application is immaterial. The parties stipulated that
his continuance in the same occupation should be a condition
precedent to the insurance attaching. There is no ground
to read this, as the appellants contend, as meaning that he
should not change to a more hazardous occupation. His
change of occupation was alone enough to prevent the policy
from going into effect.
On the conflict of laws point it was argued that a New York
statute applied to the policy and avoided the effect of the condi-
tion precedent. It was held, however, that the statute was in-
applicable because the parties had stipulated that the policy
should not take effect until delivery to the insured and payment
of the first premium. On the following basis the court selected
Massachusetts as the place of making of the contract :"o0
The application was signed in Massachusetts and the
policy was mailed from Illinois to an agent in Newburyport,
Mass. He mailed it to Ossen in New York and received the
premium by mail in Newburyport. So far as appears the
plaintiff had no office and did no business within the state
of New York.
Then, as conclusion, barring recovery under the warranty
statutes of both states, the court declared :117
But even if the (New York) statute were deemed ap-
plicable, it would not have the effect contended for. In the
absence of an authoritative decision to the contrary, we
should not interpret the statute to forbid contracting on
conditions precedent. It presupposes that the policy becomes
an effective contract, and provides that a false statement in
the application therefor "shall not bar the right to recov-
ery thereunder" unless it be of a specified type. A similar
statute in Massachusetts has recently been construed not
to affect provisions which by agreement are made condi-
tions precedent to liability.
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It is submitted that had a court been inclined to be more
liberal, it might well have found that the facts indicated most
substantial connection with New York, since the policy was to
be physically received by the applicant there and since payment
of the premium was substantially effectuated by the mailing of
his check from that state. The circumstance that the insurance
corporation might not otherwise be engaged in business in New
York appears no reason for holding that New York law might
not apply if the contract was actually made there. Further, even
"in the absence of an authoritative decision to the contrary," a
liberal court analyzing the clause in question might have recog-
nized its essential characteristic as a warranty and have held
that the New York warranty statute was intended to be applied
in favor of the insured.
4. Rules applicable to mutual benefit certificates.
In dealing with certificates issued by mutual benefit associa-
tions, any tendency of a forum to refer choice-of-laws problems
to the internal law of the association's home-state has been ac-
centuated by a few decisions 0 8 by the Supreme Court of the
United States bearing upon the requirement of full faith and
credit to the laws governing the corporation. 09 The first of these
important cases, Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green,110
was decided in 1915. With that background there will be noted
the fraternal cases in which problems of warranties and mis-
representations were presented, nearly all of which, however,
arose before the Green case. Consequently those opinions do not
fully reflect the possible influence of Supreme Court decisions
upon choice-of-laws rules in this portion of the field.
In one case when the forum was not the place of making of
the contract it has been held that its own liberal statute was
108. Hartford L. Ins. Co. v. Ibs (1915) 237 U. S. 662-at the time this
case arose the Hartford, although a stock company, was issuing "safety fund
certificates" on the assessment plan and, for some purposes, it was treated
similar to a fraternal society; Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green(1915) 237 U. S. 531; Hartford L. Ins. Co. v. Barber (1917) 245 U. S.
146; Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer (1925) 267 U. S. 544; Sovereign
Camp, Woodmen of World v. Bolin (1938) 305 U. S. 66.
109. The extent to which the full faith and credit clause requires appli-
cation of the law obtaining in the fraternal association's home-state is be-
yond the scope of the present paper; it is believed, however, that the clause
does not have the sweeping effect in this connection which is frequently
attributed to it.
110. (1915) 237 U. S. 531.
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not applicable to the case; the court did not, however, make a
clear choice between the law of the place of making and the law
of the association's home-state, although it is believed that the
court considered the rule of the place of making to be appropri-
ate.11
In some instances there is a clear showing that the court of
the state where the contract was made considered that the proper
rule was the law of the state wherein the association was incor-
porated.1" Upon examination of these cases, however, it will
be noticed that in each instance there existed in the corpora-
tion's state a liberal statute dealing with warranties and mis-
representations."- On the other hand it has been held in a recent
case"14 that a statute of the forum as place of making of the
contract applied to the contract of a foreign fraternal associa-
tion, and prevented admission of evidence to show misrepresen-
tations when a copy of the application was not attached to the
certificate.
In another instance the court adopted a novel method of avoid-
ing application of the home-state law. The carrier was admit-
edly qualified as a fraternal association under the laws of the
place where it was organized and the forum had so admitted it
to do business; statutes of its home-state permitted it to insure
in favor of "legal representatives," whereas statutes of the forum
prohibited this designation of beneficiary by a fraternal asso-
ciation. It was held"5 that its issuance to a resident of the forum
111. McKnelly v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen (1915) 160 Wis.
514, 152 N. W. 169.
112. Grand Fraternity v. Keatley (1913) 4 Boyce (Del.) 308, 88 Ati.
553; Supreme Council of American Legion of Honor v. Green (1889) 71
Md. 263, 17 Atl. 1048, 17 Am. St. Rep. 527; Supreme Council of Royal
Arcanum v. Brashears (1899) 89 Md. 624, 43 Ati. 866, 73 Am. St. Rep.
244; Valleroy v. Knights of Columbus (1909) 135 Mo. App. 574, 116 S. W.
1130.
113. In Grand Fraternity v. Keatley (1913) 4 Boyce (Del.) 308, 88 Atl.
553, the applicant represented that he had not consulted a physician since
an attack of mumps in childhood; evidence was offered by the association
that the insured had since had an operation, had consulted doctors repeat-
edly for kidney ailment and had been advised that he was suffering from
diabetes; it was held that the misrepresentation was material.
Accord: Valleroy v. Knights of Columbus (1909) 135 Mo. App. 574, 116
S. W. 1180.
114. Bukowski v. Security Ben. Assoc. of Topeka, Kan. (1935) 221 Iowa
416, 261 N. W. 783.
See also Coverdale v. Royal Arcanum (1901) 193 Ill. 91, 61 N. E. 915,
holding that certificate was a local contract (by place of making rule) and
governed by internal law principles of waiver.
115. Herzberg v. Modern Brotherhood of America (1905) 110 Mo. App.
828, 85 S. W. 986.
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of a certificate naming a legal representative took this insurer
out of protective rules governing fraternal associations and
brought it under the broad, liberal misrepresentation statute of
the forum applicable to legal reserve companies.
In another opinion involving a foreign fraternal association n1
the Missouri court applied a local rule in a less direct fashion.
A certificate was issued by a fraternal association admitted to
do business in Missouri, the place of making of the contract and
the place of residence of the member not being shown in the
opinion. The court held that while the contract was not to be
determined by reference to the local statute relating to warran-
ties and misrepresentations, nevertheless "under the established
rule of decision in this state, defendant should have returned the
assessment promptly or within a reasonable time at least, or it
will be treated as having waived the forfeiture" based upon the
misrepresentations. The effect of this is, of course, to declare
that the law of the association's home-office applies to warran-
ties and misrepresentations, and then to nullify normal conse-
quences of forfeiture by applying an internal law rule of the
forum that waiver results from failure to return an assessment
promptly. What amounts to a waiver of forfeiture for false
statements should be determined by the same law which de-
clares the existence and effect of misrepresentations.
The fact that reference by a court of the forum to rules obtain-
ing at the association's home-state may not always be advan-
tageous to the fraternal order is indicated by Valleroy v. Knights
of Columbus.117 The court of the forum and place of making
there ruled that neither domestic nor foreign fraternal associa-
tions were governed by its own liberal statute and, consequently,
that health statements may be warranties which will avoid the
contract if untrue. The opinion then stated that, in reference
to contracts of foreign fraternal associations, a court will look
to laws of their home-states to determine the effect to be given
to their contracts. The case was remanded because of erroneous
application of the local statute. As the law of the corporation's
home-state was not shown, possible evidence at a new trial might
prove a liberal statute there in force abrogating the effect of the
116. Francis v. Supreme Lodge, Ancient Order of United Workmen
(1910) 150 Mo. App. 347, 130 S. W. 500.
117. (1909) 135 Mo. App. 574, 116 S. W. 1130.
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strict warranty doctrine which the court indicated would other-
wise be applied by the forum because its own statute did not
extend to contracts of any fraternal associations.
The available cases involving fraternal certificates which re-
late to problems of warranties and representations do not indi-
cate a definite adoption of the law of the association's home-state
as appropriate to govern these problems. It appears that in
these cases, also, a court at the place of making has applied
either its local rule or the rule of the place of incorporation,
whichever it felt would be more favorable to the beneficiary in
meeting problems presented by the strict doctrines governing
warranties.
5. Procedural and substantive aspects of warranty statutes.
The very title to this subdivision raises a difficult question-
the dividing line between substance and procedure. The abun-
dance of legal literature, 118 presenting argument from various
angles and suggesting criteria for differentiation, is justification
for not attempting to answer that question in this article dealing
with only a limited portion of the conflict of laws field. Some
general considerations bearing upon substance and procedure in
warranty and misrepresentation cases may, however, be sug-
gested.
One of the chief ends of the body of conflict of laws rules is
that the rights and duties of parties arising out of a foreign-
based transaction shall not materially be changed by reason of
the choice of a forum for trial of the case. When a court con-
siders such a case it would be possible to view all the necessary
fact-circumstances, including the foreign rule of law, as simply
substantive, in the sense that without them there can be no re-
covery and that all bear upon the right of the plaintiff; no court
does this. Or a court might adopt the opposite view that all
118. See, in general, the following: Ailes, Substance and Procedure in
the Conflict of Laws (1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 392; Tunks, Categorization
and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 271; Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 333; Arnold, The R8le of Substantive
Law and Procedure in the Legal Process (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 617;
McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws
(1930) 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933; Minor, Conflict of Laws-Substance or Obli-
gation of Contract Distinguished from Remedy (1903) 16 Harv. L. Rev.
262; Note, Conflict of Laws-Law Governing the Determination of Whether
Question is one of Remedy or of Right (1926) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 44.
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matters in the gamut through pleadings and evidence to judg-
ment are procedural, in the sense that they all bear upon the
mode in which the plaintiff establishes his claim, and that foreign
law had nothing to do with the case whatsoever; neither does
any court do this. The latter method of treatment would violate
the fundamental conceptions of fairness which underlie the prin-
ciples of conflict of laws; the former would disregard all possible
factors of interest, administrative convenience and social policy
of the forum."9
Whether a question is one of substance or of procedure-that
is, determination of the way in which the court will proceed-is
decided according to the conflict of laws rules of the forum, and
all matters classified as procedure are governed by the law of
the forum. 1 20 When a court decides that a point should be treated
as procedure, it may affect the rights of the parties, since a
different result might have been reached had suit been brought
in another state; the selection is limited because of reasons of
convenience and local policy. 12'1 These facts indicate that the line
between the two categories is not fixed and arbitrary but varies
according to the purpose for which the selection is made. Some
points are clear. It is clear that in conflict of laws cases courts
have found it useful to distinguish between "procedural" and
"substantive" matters for some purposes; that on many proposi-
tions there is general agreement regarding the category into
which the issue shall be placed; that the line between the two
divisions may shift according to the purpose for which deter-
mination is made; and that decisions in concrete cases are based
upon factors of administrative convenience and social policy of
the forum.
But difficulty and doubt arise in determining when a court will
find the scales tipped by administrative convenience or social
policy and what considerations give content to those phrases. It
is suggested that the "social policy" behind the determination
119. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) c. 12, Introductory Note
preceding §584: "A limitation upon the scope of the reference to the foreign
law is thus necessary. Such limitation excludes those phases of the case
which make administration of the foreign law by the local tribunal imprac-
ticable, inconvenient, or violative of local policy. In these instances, the
local rules of the forum are applied and are classified as matters of pro-
cedure * * * ."
120. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) §§584, 585.
121. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) §584, comment b.
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that certain matters relating to warranties and representations
are "procedural," and hence to be governed by the law of the
forum, lies in the harshness of the warranty doctrine itself.
When their own legislatures have announced a liberal rule for
dealing with these problems, some courts which are confronted
with a stringent rule obtaining in a sister-state may seek to
apply their local rule to ameliorate hardship in even a foreign-
based transaction, especially if the contract has any important
contacts with the forum. But opinions in conflict of laws in this
portion of the insurance field are notable for lack of explanation
why particular provisions were considered by the court as sub-
stantive or as procedural. Judging from the language in the
opinions, it appears that the courts have been applying rules of
thumb, nor do the opinions reflect any consistent tendency by
the courts to inquire into substantive or procedural classification
of statutory or common law rules of the sister-state wherein
those rules obtained.
The enactment in some states of legislation of divergent types
to deal with warranties and misrepresentations has raised prob-
lems of application by the forum of either its own rule or that
of a sister-state whose law is chosen as otherwise properly gov-
erning the contract. The law of the sister-state may be either
common law or statutory. But it should be noticed that predic-
tion cannot be predicated merely upon catch-words in a statute;
for example, a forum may consider a foreign statute substan-
tive, in the conflict of laws sense, although it uses terminology,
such as "introduced into evidence," which is in other instances
usually associated with procedure. If a conflict of laws case is
brought in a state which was regarded by the court as also being
the place of delivery-as most cases have been-there need be
no problem of differentiation between substance and procedure,
unless the forum adopts a conflict of laws rule which refers to
the law of some other state as properly governing the contract;
the latter has been done in a few instances. 122 Thus in a large
part of the field here considered courts have been enabled to
avoid the problem.
122. This was done in Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v. Lovelace (1907)
1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S. E. 93; Connecticut Gen. L. Ins. Co. v. Richardson
(1919) 11 Ohio App. 405; Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Pollard (1896) 94
Va. 146, 26 S. E. 421, 86 L. R. A. 271, 64 Am. St. Rep. 715. The problem
might also arise in connection with certificates of fraternal societies.
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The warranty cases in the aggregate contain no clear answer
to the question of when a common law or statutory rule of either
the forum or of a sister-state will be determined to be substantive
and when procedural. The cases which consider the problem in
warranty cases and which indicate a clear choice are about
equally divided between those which treat as substantive and
apply a statutory or common law rule of the place whose law is
chosen as properly governing the contract,123 and those cases
which reject that rule and apply their own local statutory or com-
mon law rules as properly governing a matter there denominated
procedural.124 The notes below indicate whether rules of the
respective states were statutory or common law rules.
123. Great Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Burwell (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 12 F.(2d) 244, cert. den. (1926) 271 U. S. 683, held, on removal, that the statute
of the place of making was a substantive rule to be applied by a federal
court.
Provident Sav. L. Assur. Soc. of N. Y. v. Hadley (C. C. A. 1, 1900)
102 Fed. 856, is in accord with the Burwell case without discussing ques-
tions of substance and procedure; cf. Mutual L. Ina. Co. of N. Y. v. Hilton-
Green (C. C. A. 5, 1913) 202 Fed. 113.
Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v. Lovelace (1907) 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S. E.
93-the law chosen to govern the contract was statutory but no indication is
given in the opinion concerning the rule of the forum which may, therefore
and for the purpose of that case, be presumed common law; but cf. Massa-
chusetts Ben. L. Assoc. v. Robinson (1898) 104 Ga. 256, 30 S. E. 918, 42
L. R. A. 261, in which the rule of the state governing the contract was
not shown (and hence might be presumed to be the strict doctrine of the
common law) and the forum applied its own statute as procedural, bolstered
by a presumption that the rule of the state governing the contract was the
same.
Rauen v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1906) 129 Iowa 725, 106 N. W. 198-
foreign statute regarding attaching of application applied by forum without
discussing local rule.
Mutual L. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Wiegmann (1923) 214 Mo. App. 54, 256
S. W. 505-forum clearly recognized a foreign statutory rule as substantive
and, to effectuate it, allowed the unusual remedy of cancellation.
New York L. Ins. Co. v. Rigas (1933) 117 Conn. 437, 168 Atl. 22, is to
the same effect as the Wiegmann case.
McKnelly v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen (1915) 160 Wis. 514, 152
N. W. 169-rules of the forum and place governing the contract were both
statutory.
124. Des Moines L. Assoc. v. Owen (1897) 10 Colo. App. 131, 50 Pac.
210-an apparently common law rule of the forum was employed to defeat
the statutory provision of the state chosen to govern the contract, under
which the insurer would be precluded from pleading or proving falsity of
facts in an unattached application.
Massachusetts Ben. L. Assoc. v. Robinson (1898) 104 Ga. 256, 30 S. E.
918, 42 L. R. A. 261-see note 123, supra, and cf. Missouri State L. Ins.
Co. v. Lovelace (1907) 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S. E. 93, note 123, supra.
Nelson v. Nederland L. Ins. Co. (1900) 110 Iowa 600, 81 N. W. 807, al-
though the case could have been decided on the basis that forum was the
place of making, in applying a local statute regarding estoppel on health
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Application of the rule of procedure may be illustrated. In
an Ohio case, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v.
Richardson,15 suit was brought upon an accident policy by the
wife as beneficiary, the insured having drowned under circum-
stances which suggested suicide. The company defended upon
the bases of misrepresentations in procuring the policy and sui-
cide of the insured. The applicant had resided in Ohio but the
contract had been countersigned in New York and was there
delivered to an agent of the insured. The court first said "The
validity, nature and effect of a contract are governed by the law
of the place with reference to which it is made" but, in answer
to the contention that the law of New York properly governed
these issues, the court pointed to the Ohio statute26 and said :127
statements, the court said: "Whether the policy is a New York contract
or not, the laws of this state relating to procedure control. * * * The rule
of the statute so evidently relates to procedure that discussion of the point
is not required." The New York rule was not indicated.
Connecticut Gen. L. Ins. Co. v. Richardson (1919) 11 Ohio App. 405-
although forum treated New York as the place of making and did not
discuss the rule there obtaining, a local statute which "provides when an
application for insurance may be used in evidence and when it will bar a
recovery in an action on a policy based on such application" was said to be
remedial and was applied.
Moak v. Continental Casualty Co. (1927) 4 Tenn. App. 287-forum,
apparently as a matter of local policy, applied a local estoppel statute;
the law of the place of making was presumed to be the same as the forum.
Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Pollard (1896) 94 Va. 146, 26 S. E. 421,
86 L. R. A. 271, 64 Am. St. Rep. 715-the forum was undoubtedly the place
of making, but, in deference to a clause referring to the state of the home-
office, the court looked to a liberal statute of Ohio dealing with misrepre-
sentations; "this statute was as much a part of every contract of life
insurance governed by the laws of the state of Ohio * * * as if incor-
porated in it"; but as to the admission of evidence: "It is true that a por-
tion of the statute in question provided that no answer to any interrogatory
made by an applicant for a policy of insurance shall be used in evidence
except under certain circumstances. The admission of evidence and the rules
of evidence are matters of procedure, rather than matters touching the
rights of the parties under their contracts. * * * That portion of the statute
does not affect either the validity, nature, or interpretation of the contract,
but applies alone to the remedy, and in the enforcement of the contract in
this state will not be regarded, but our mode of procedure will be followed."
125. (1919) 11 Ohio App. 405.
126. Same as Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page 1926) §9391: "No answer to
any interrogatory made by an applicant, in his or her application for a
policy, shall bar the right to recover upon any policy issued thereon, or be
used in evidence upon any trial to recover upon such policy, unless it be
clearly proved that such answer is willfully false, was fraudulently made,
that it is material, and induced the company to issue the policy, and that
but for such answer the policy would not have been issued; and also that
the agent of the company had no knowledge of the falsity or fraud of such
answer."
127. (1919) 11 Ohio App. 405, 407, 408, 409, 410; italics are added.
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There is no question as to the validity of the contract
raised in this case. The section under consideration pro-
vides what must be established before any answer in the
application will bar a recovery, and under what conditions
such an application may be used in evidence on a trial to
recover on a policy of insurance. * * * Section 9391, General
Code, is remedial. It provides when an application for in-
surance may be used in evidence and when it will bar a
recovery in an action on a policy based on such application.
* ** The fourth ground urged by plaintiff in error, that the
policy was void for misrepresentations in the application
and error of the trial court in refusing a peremptory in-
struction on that ground, will not be discussed. The basis
of counsel's contention is that this is a New York contract,
and that section 9391, General Code, is not applicable. We
have found that the law of Ohio on insurance policies re-
lates to the remedy, and is applicable to injuries resulting
in death.
The court also applied the Ohio rule that when a person is
drowned the presumption is against suicide, and ruled that the
questions were properly submitted to the jury.
There is little reason to believe that the contract in the
Richardson case had any important connection with Ohio except
that it was the forum of the suit. The court did not mention
factors appearing in the policy from which a presumed refer-
ence to the law of Ohio might possibly be inferred; it did not
appear that the company was engaged in business in Ohio at
the time of issuance of the policy; and it mentioned that the
policy was, in fact, delivered in New York. Application of the
Ohio statute as "procedural" may be inferred to have changed
the rights of the parties and to have subsumed an essentially
foreign-based transaction under rules applicable to strictly do-
mestic contracts. It is probable that the rule here followed
would violate the principle of the later decision in John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Yates. 12 At any rate, the
court's reasoning that the Ohio statute was procedural is clearly
wrong.
In the Yates case, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court of
the United States overturned application by Georgia courts120
128. (1936) 299 U. S. 178.
129. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Yates (1936) 182 Ga. 213, 185
S. E. 268, affirming (1935) 50 Ga. App. 713, 179 S. E. 239.
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of a local rule, similar to that of Ohio in the Richardson case,
to the effect that the materiality of false answers constituted a
question for the jury. That decision by the Supreme Court
clearly shows that in life insurance cases a statutory or common
law rule of the forum may not constitutionally be applied in dis-
regard of substantive rights created by the law properly govern-
ing the contract. That decision was based upon the full faith
and credit clause, as applied to properly pleaded statutes of New
York establishing an entirely different rule than that applied by
the forum, but there is some indication in the opinion that the
Court thought that the due process clause also might be ap-
plicable.1 0 In other phases of conflict of laws there are Supreme
Court cases reaching similar results on the substance-procedure
problem, basing their decisions upon both the full faith and
credit clause and the due process of laws clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.-3
An earlier Georgia case,1 3 2 relied upon by the lower courts in
the Yates case, and the decision by the Iowa court in Nelson v.
Nederland Life Insurance Company- 3 (and perhaps the decision
in the Richardson case) would hardly come within the ruling of
the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of full
faith and credit because the insurer failed to plead and prove
statutes of the place of making of the contract.
But, particularly in view of the dictum by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Yates case, it appears that the Su-
preme Court may review a gross disregard of the law of a state
which should be taken as properly governing the life insurance
130. See 299 U. S. 178, 182, where Mr. Justice Brandeis cited Home In-
surance Company v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397, which was decided under
the due process clause, in partial support of a statement of the grounds
on which the law of the forum was improperly applied. And see Hilpert
& Cooley, The Constitution and the Choice of Law (1939) 25 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QUARTERLY 27, 39.
The point may here be repeated that details of the scope of the due
process and full faith and credit clauses are beyond the compass of this
paper; for periodical materials bearing upon these clauses see note 47,
Part One, supra.
131. See Broderick v. Rosner (1935) 294 U. S. 629; Home Insurance
Company v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397; Hartford Accid. & Inden. Co. v.
Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 292 U. S. 143; cf. Metropolitan Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Brownell (1935) 294 U. S. 580. See also Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co. (1941) 313 U. S. 487.
132. Massachusetts Ben. L. Assoc. v. Robinson (1898) 104 Ga. 256, 30
S. E. 918, 42 L. R. A. 261.
183. (1900) 110 Iowa 600, 81 N. W. 807, note 91, supra.
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contract, and that statutes of the state whose law should govern
the contract, couched in terminology usually associated with pro-
cedural matters, may yet be interpreted as conferring strictly
substantive rights. A disregard of those substantive rights by
another state as forum, even under the guise of applying its
own remedial rules as a matter of policy, will be subject to
possible reversal under either the due process clause or the full
faith and credit clause, as the occasion may require.
6. Reinstatement.
Various holdings have -been made -by the few courts dealing
with conflict of laws problems involving misrepresentations in
securing reinstatement of lapsed policies. In the earlier portion
of this article reference was made to Bottomley v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company 1a in which the Massachusetts court held
that its liberal misrepresentation statute did not apply to rein-
statement there effected upon what had originally been a Rhode
Island contract; it was suggested that the court might well have
held that the reinstatement resulted in a new contract, made in
Massachusetts, within the terms of the liberal statute there in
force.
A different approach was taken in Lincoln National Life In-
surance Company of Fort Wayne v. Hammer,-r5 wherein suit
was brought to cancel a reinstatement procured by misrepre-
sentations. The original contract was probably governed by the
law of North Dakota, from which state the application for rein-
statement was mailed; it was accepted at the home-office of the
insurer in Indiana. A North Dakota statute was favorable to
the insured, but the court, applying the test of the "last act
necessary to a meeting of the minds," ruled that the reinstate-
ment was an Indiana, and not a North Dakota, contract.
Another case1 8 is not as clear as the foregoing decisions. A
policy, apparently taken out in Missouri, had been allowed to
lapse and application was there later made for reinstatement.
At the time of the lapse the insured was in good health; prior
to the application for reinstatement he had been operated upon
for peritonitis. The circumstances were disclosed to the solicitor
but, in the belief that qualification for reinstatement was deter-
134. (1898) 170 Mass. 274, 49 N. E. 438, note 53, Part One, supra.
135. (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 41 F. (2d) 12.
136. Bank Say. L. Ins. Co. v. Butler (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 972.
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mined by the date of lapse, the agent did not report the facts
to the home-office. A Missouri statute provided that any person
soliciting application for insurance upon the life of another shall,
in any controversy between the assured or his beneficiary and
the company, be regarded as agent of the company. The court
held that the carrier was estopped to deny that the policy was
reinstated. The court did not consider what factors might deter-
mine the proper law to govern reinstatement. There are several
possibilities: (a) the law of the place where the original policy
was taken out; (b) the law of the place where application for
reinstatement was made; (c) the law of the insurer's home-
office, as the place where the application for reinstatement was
accepted; (d) the law of the place where the reinstated policy
was "delivered" to the applicant although, under current com-
pany practices, the insured is merely notified that reinstatement
has been effected. The last would almost invariably make the
rule the same as that in (b)-the place where application for
reinstatement was made.
An illustration of sound results reached under conflict of laws
rules is found in two recent cases, 137 one decided by the Missouri
court and the other by a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. In
the Missouri case the contract in suit had been issuedby a New
York carrier to a resident of Kansas where a misrepresentation
statute was in force. The court held that the Kansas law should
be applied to the following issues in the case: whether the mis-
representation statute includes misrepresentations in procuring
reinstatement; the placing and scope of the burden of proof; and
whether the insurer may defend an action on the policy, upon
the ground that reinstatement was procured by fraud, notwith-
standing that the contestability period for the original policy
had expired. On the last point, contest by the carrier was per-
mitted. In the federal case the contract had been made in the
state where the federal court was held; it referred to the law
of that state but did not elaborate the choice-of-laws question,
as it might well have done.
Whatever may be the best rule to govern other types of prob-
lems raised by reinstatement of lapsed policies, it is suggested
187. Chambers v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1940) 138 S. W.
(2d) 29; Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Critz (C. C. A. 5, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 417,
cert. den. (1940) 309 U. S. 684.
1942]
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that, for purposes of warranties and misrepresentations in se-
curing reinstatement, the proper rule is the law of the state
where application for reinstatement was made, treating it as a
new contract. The law of the state of the insurer's home-office
is likely to be more favorable to the company and therefore un-
acceptable to the state of the forum if it was also the place of
making of the contract of reinstatement; this is especially likely
to be true if the forum was also the place where the original
contract of insurance was made.
CONCLUSIONS
An examination of the cases dealing with warranties and mis-
representations in the conflict of laws indicates that the courts
have not consistently followed any single rule. The judicial ap-
proach to these problems has been strongly affected by the com-
plexities arising from the peculiar development of related doc-
trines in the internal law portion of the insurance field; the
variations in statutory modifications of common law rules, also,
have been an important factor. Peculiar problems have arisen
in which unfairness to the insured could result from deficiencies
which were often trivial.
To meet these difficulties it seems that the courts have decided
conflict of laws cases as the result of a weighing and balancing
of various factors in their relation to the laws of several states.
But the opinions in these cases have expressed the results of the
judicial evaluation of factors in terms of broad conflict of laws
rules which are subject to various meanings and are not self-
defining; in addition, courts have not been entirely consistent in
following any single one of the accepted "rules" to govern con-
tracts in the conflict of laws. Indeed, in six jurisdictions the
opinions dealing only with representations and warranties, and
hence not showing additional possible differences in other phases
of insurance problems, have stated inconsistent rules.1 8 These
138. Georgia: -Missouri State L. Ins. Co. v. Lovelace (1907) 1 Ga. App.
446, 58 S. E. 93 (intention test looking to place of performance and express
provision for governing law held effectual in forum as place of making);
Massachusetts Ben. L. Assoc. v. Robinson (1898) 104 Ga. 256, 30 S. E.
918, 42 L. R. A. 261 (dictum that intention test looking to place of per-
formance would be a proper rule, but local statute applied as procedural;
forum was place of making). Cf. in the federal court, Royal Union Mut.
L. Ins. Co. v. Wynn (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1910) 177 Fed. 289 (place of making
test).
Maryland: Fidelity Mut. L~. Assoc. of Philadelphia v. Ficklin (1891) 74
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practices have created uncertainty regarding the rules which
were actually being applied. But because most courts have ex-
plained their decisions in terms of the rule of the place of making
of the contract, some considerations underlying the judicial eva-
luation of important factors can be reached, and some outline
of the degree of consistency in utilization of a single rule can be
marked.
The cases reveal that a liberal statutory or decisional rule of
the forum will be applied if the court, by adopting that conno-
tation of delivery which relates to physical receipt of the policy
by the applicant, finds that the forum was the place of making
of the insurance contract. Reference to liberal rules of the forum
has been supported by the explanation in the opinion that the
choice-of-laws rule adopted is that of the place of making. But
when the contract had its inception while the applicant was a
Md. 172, 21 Atl. 680 (rule of place with reference to which contract was
made); Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Mullen (1908) 107 Md. 457, 69 "Atl. 385
(applied place of making rule and holds that an express provision for
governing law is ineffectual in forum as place of making).
Massachusetts: Bottomley v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. (1898) 170 Mass.
274, 49 N. E. 438 (place of performance rule); Dolan v. Mut. Res. Fund
L. Assoc. (1899) 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E. 398 (place of making rule); and
cf. Reagan v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1910) 207 Mass. 79, 92 N. E. 1025
(apparently applies internal law rule).
Ohio: Connecticut General L. Ins. Co. v. Richardson (1919) 11 Ohio
App. 405 (court states that validity of contract is determined by rule of
place with reference to which contract was made, but actually applies law
of place of forum as a procedural rule); New York L. Ins. Co. v. Block
(1893) 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Dec. 166 (court purports to follow the rule-of-
reference and actually applies rule of place of making).
Texas: Seiders v. Merchants' L. Assoc. of U. S. (1900) 93 Tex. 194,
54 S. W. 753 (place of performance rule); Atlas L. Ins. Co. v. Standfler
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 86 S. W. (2d) 852 (place of making rule); Pacific
Mut. L. Ins. Co. of California v. Hale (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 267 S. W.
282 (place of making rule); Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. v. Harris (1900) 94
Tex. 25, 57 S. W. 635, 86 Am. St. Rep. 813 (apparently applying intention
test, holds that an express provision in the policy for governing law is
effectual in forum as place of making).
Circuit Courts of Appeal: In the 2nd Circuit-Mutual Trust L. Ins. Co. v.
Ossen (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 317 (making); Carrollton Furn. Mfg.
Co. v. American Credit Indem. Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1902) 115 Fed. 77 (not
life insurance-making test); but cf. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Cohen (C.
C. A. 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 66 (although consistent with the place of making
test, the opinion apparently applies the rule of the place with reference to
which the contract was made). In the 6th Circuit-Penn Mutual L. Ins.
Co. v. Mechanics' Say. Bank & Trust Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1896) 72 Fed. 413
(applies the rule of the place with reference to which the contract was
made). The overwhelming majority of the cases in all Circuit Courts of
Appeal applied the place of making test in the period before the rule in
Brie R. R. v. Tompkins required federal courts to follow the rules of the
states in which they are held.
19421
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resident of another state, on the whole the conflict of laws cases,
as opposed to the internal law cases, indicate little inclination
by courts to draw factors within the protection of general in-
surance principles obtaining in the forum, and the usual refer-
ence is to the law of the place where the contract was made.
Unusual attempts by a court to attain control over such con-
tracts, through the so-called procedural statutes, will receive a
severe check under the rule of the Yates case holding that the
full faith and credit clause, and indicating that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also, may be used to review
unconstitutional selection of rules governing these contracts.
But the conflict of laws cases also show that when the insured
was resident in the forum-at the time the contract had its incep-
tion, and when the internal law rules of the forum are less
favorable to the claimant than rules obtaining in the insurer's
home-state, a court may apply the law of the latter place. The
circumstance that the policy provided that it was made there,
or that it was to be governed by the laws of that place, or that
it was to be performed there, may be given effect. That effect
may be expressed in the opinion by saying that "the contract
was made there," using some connotation of delivery other than
that of manual receipt of the policy; or by saying that "the con-
tract was to be performed there," with or without specification
of the element of performance which is controlling in the par-
ticular case; or by saying that "the parties intended" that law
to apply. The peculiar problems raised by various principles
operating in different states to govern warranties and misrepre-
sentations have resulted in shifting judicial emphasis upon the
various rules which are available in determining conflict of laws
issues concerning them.
Confusion is most nearly eliminated if it is recognized that
the opinions in these cases generally reflect the principle that
neither the place of performance rule nor the rule effectuating
an expressed intention of the parties will be operative in viola-
tion of other fundamental policy considerations obtaining in the
forum. It seems that if the common or statutory rules of the
forum are more favorable to the claimant than rules obtaining
in the insurer's home-state, and if the insurance contract in ques-
tion has such substantial relationship to the forum that it may
be said to have been "made" there, these circumstances are of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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themselves determinative that a strong rule of policy exists in
the forum requiring application of its general rules governing
these questions; the selection of the local law is then expressed
as resulting from the conflict of laws rule that the law of the
place where the contract was made governs questions of warran-
ties and misrepresentations. To the extent that rules of the ap-
plicant's home-state are most liberal, it may be taken that the
courts will tend to determine that the contract was made there
and to adhere, with at least verbal consistency, to the rule of
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